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Abstract—Data security and energy aware communication
are key aspects in design of modern ad hoc networks. In
this paper we investigate issues associated with the devel-
opment of secure IEEE 802.15.4 based wireless sensor net-
works (WSNs) – a special type of ad hoc networks. We fo-
cus on energy aware security architectures and protocols for
use in WSNs. To give the motivation behind energy efficient
secure networks, first, the security requirements of wireless
sensor networks are presented and the relationships between
network security and network lifetime limited by often in-
sufficient resources of network nodes are explained. Second,
a short literature survey of energy aware security solutions for
use in WSNs is presented.
Keywords—energy aware security architectures, routing proto-
cols, security protocols, wireless sensor networks, WSN.
1. Introduction
A Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) is a distributed system
composed of hundreds or thousands small-size, inexpen-
sive, embedded devices deployed densely over a signiﬁcant,
often hostile area [1]. Each device can run applications
and participate in transferring data to recipients within its
range. The lack of ﬁxed network infrastructure components
in WSN allows creating unique topologies and enables the
dynamic adjustment of individual nodes to the current net-
work structure in order to execute assigned tasks.
WSNs have been identiﬁed as one of the most important
technologies of this century. Due to their sensing capa-
bilities, CPU power and radio transceiver plenty of sensor
devices can be deployed in a sensing area, hence they can
be used in applications, in which traditional networks are
inadequate. However, nodes comprised by the network are
often small battery-fed devices, which means their power
source is limited [1]–[3]. The network’s throughput is also
limited. Moreover, the quality of wireless transmission de-
pends on numerous external factors, like weather condi-
tions or landform features. Part of those factors change with
time.
Conventional networks with ﬁxed infrastructure require
protection against injection or modiﬁcation of dissemi-
nated data packets and eavesdropping. Most applications of
WSNs require the same protection. All well known attacks
including traﬃc analysis, node replication, Denial of Ser-
vice (DOS) and physical manipulating should be concerned.
The security threads and attacks for all layers of the OSI
model are discussed in [4]. Moreover, due to the sponta-
neous nature and shared wireless medium, sensor networks
are more vulnerable to security attacks than wired ones.
Using a computer with a wireless network adapter, anyone
can gain an access to an unprotected network. Hence, the
outsider can monitor the network, participate in the com-
munication and easily launch attacks.
The main contribution of this paper is to point out the prob-
lems concerned with energy aware security architectures
and protocols for IEEE 802.15.4 based WSN. It is a topic
that has been a subject of intensive research in the recent
years. The question is how to ensure the expected secu-
rity level taking into account scarce resources of devices
(network nodes). In Sections 2 and 3, we brieﬂy sum-
marize security requirements and security issues in WSN.
Next, we present energy aware security architectures and
protocols (Section 4), and energy eﬃcient secure routing
protocols (Section 5). The paper concludes in Section 6.
2. Security Requirements of WSN
Security for wireless sensor networks should focus on the
protection of the data itself and the network connections be-
tween the nodes [5]–[8]. In general, security requirements
often vary with application. In WSNs we can distinguish the
following important requirements of security capabilities:
authentication and authorization, availability, conﬁdential-
ity, integrity and freshness. Thus, we need some mechanism
for access authorization and protecting a mobile code. In
many applications we need to protect fair access to com-
munication channels and at the same time we often need to
hide the information about physical location of our sensor
node. Moreover, we need to secure routing and we have
to defend our network against denial of service, malicious
ﬂows, node capturing and node injection, etc.
Authorization. Data authorization speciﬁes access rights
to resources and is strongly related to access control. Ac-
cess control should prevent unauthorized users from par-
ticipating in network resources. Hence, only authorized
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users can join a given network. Access control relies on
access policies that are formalized, like access control rules
in a computer system. Most modern operating systems in-
clude access control.
Authentication. Message authentication implies a sender
veriﬁcation using cryptographic key. Authentication mech-
anisms are used to detect maliciously or spoofed packets.
They are especially important in WSNs which use a shared
wireless medium. In case of unicast transmission, an au-
thentication can be guaranteed by symmetric key cryptog-
raphy, using Message Authentication Code (MAC) in IEEE
802.15.4. Broadcast authentication requires more complex
solutions (see [9]).
Availability. In secure network data should be safe and
accessible at all times. Availability guarantees the surviv-
ability of network services against Denial-of-Service (DoS)
attacks that can be launched at any layer of a wireless
sensor network, and may disable a given device (network
node) permanently. Moreover, DoS attack involved exces-
sive computation and communication may exhaust battery
charge of a sensor device.
Confidentiality. In WSN keeping sensitive data secret is
the most important issue in case of critical applications
in which highly sensitive data (secret keys, sensitive mea-
surements, etc.) are collected and transmitted. Data con-
ﬁdentiality ensures that sensitive data is never disclosed to
unauthorized users or entities. Hence, measurement data
should not be available to neighboring nodes, and secure
channels between nodes should be created. To protect a net-
work against cyberattacks and malicious nodes, the routing
information and sensor identities should remain conﬁden-
tial too. The standard approach to prevent end-to-end data
conﬁdentiality is to encrypt the data with a secret key.
Integrity and freshness. Data integrity is the quality of
correctness, completeness, wholeness, soundness and com-
pliance with the intention of the creators of the data. It
is achieved by preventing unauthorized insertion, modiﬁ-
cation or destruction of data. In WSNs a malicious node
may change messages to perturb the network functional-
ity. Moreover, due to unreliable communication channels
it is easy to inject infected packets or alerted data. In
WSNs data integrity guarantees that a message being trans-
ferred is never corrupted, but providing data integrity is
not enough for wireless communication. The compromised
sensor nodes can listen to transmitted messages and replay
attacks. Data freshness protects data against replay attacks
by ensuring that the transmitted data is recent one.
3. Security in WSN
Cryptography is the common approach for defense against
cyber attacks. However, maintaining an appropriate level of
security and protection of sensitive information transmitted
by a wireless sensor network requires solving many issues
that are not present in traditional computer networks, and
it is a challenging task [8], [10]. It should be underlined
that the primary objective of wireless sensor networks is to
make measurements for as long as possible. To do this it is
essential to minimize energy use by reducing the amount of
inter-node transmission and using energy aware algorithms
and protocols [1], [2]. Due to limited resources of nodes
forming WSN a balance between security capability and
lifetime performance has to be obtained. Strong security
protocols based on an asymmetric cryptography are diﬃ-
cult to implement. In general, asymmetric signatures are
long and need high communication overhead, thus they are
impractical for WSN applications. On the other side, week
security protocols based on a symmetric cryptography may
be easily broken. Moreover, due to a hostile deployment
area, it is diﬃcult to perform continuous surveillance of
a network. To design a completely secure sensor network,
security must be integrated into each node of WSN. Any
network node implemented without any security could eas-
ily become a point of attack. Therefore, it is crucial to de-
sign WSN with security in mind from the very beginning. It
is obvious that security usually adds some communication
overhead and requires intensive computation and memory
that is concerned with increased power consumption. The
integration of security techniques in processing and com-
munications simply allows for more eﬃcient use of limited
resources.
In general, three types of key management security schemes
can be considered:
• Trusted server scheme. The symmetric key cryptog-
raphy for data encryption is used. The process of
establishing the key agreement between two commu-
nicating nodes is executed in the base station. Each
node has to store only a single secret key. Thus,
this solution is memory eﬃcient, but energy expen-
sive due to transmission overhead – each node has to
communicate with the base station many times.
• Self enforcing scheme. The public key cryptography
for communication between sensor nodes is used –
DSA or RSA cryptography schemes. The disadvan-
tage is that both DSA and RSA require complex com-
putations (computing and energy expensive solution).
• Key-predistribution scheme. The symmetric key
cryptography with limited number of keys stored in
each sensor node is proposed. This solution is en-
ergy eﬃcient – it does not introduce any additional
transmission overhead for key exchange.
In many secure architectures and routing protocols, the
clustering schemes for grouping all network nodes into dis-
joint and mostly non-overlapping clusters are applied to
WSN [11], [12]. Generally, a cluster formation in WSN is
based on the following characteristics: every node has to
be connected to some clusters, nodes in a cluster must be
able to communicate with others, often maximum diameter
of all clusters in the network is the same. Most algorithms
form clusters in distributed way through local broadcasts
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with a maximum one or several (not many) hops. The
cluster size is adapted to network capabilities and objec-
tives. The cluster head is usually pre-assigned or picked
randomly from the deployed set of nodes. Finally, we ob-
tain a hierarchical communication structure: base station,
cluster heads (various levels) and the lowest level formed
by members of clusters (remaining nodes).
4. Energy Eﬃcient Security
Architectures and Protocols
In this section, we survey some of more and less com-
mon security solutions for IEEE 802.15.4 based networks.
We start from the short description of the IEEE 802.15.4
security implementation. Next, we present various energy
eﬃcient architectures that can be employed in physical, data
link, network, and middleware layers of the OSI communi-
cation model.
4.1. Security in IEEE 802.15.4
IEEE 802.15.4 is one of the ﬁrst standards deﬁning the ra-
dio and the medium access control layer for a low-power
wireless sensor networks. ZigBee [13] is an industry al-
liance working on the 802.15.4 and upper protocol layers.
Medium Access Control (MAC) protocols guarantee eﬃ-
cient access to the communication media while carefully
managing the energy allotted to the node. This goal is
typically achieved by switching the radio to a low-power
mode based on the current transmission schedule. The
comprehensive summary of MAC protocols for WSNs, and
results of simulations that show their capabilities and eﬃ-
ciency in terms of the energy consumption are presented
in [14]. The IEEE 802.15.4 network standard speciﬁcation
provides several security suits [15], [16]. The security suite
speciﬁcation deﬁnes the algorithms and operations that will
be performed depending upon the security services to be
provided. Each node can operate in secured or unsecured
mode. A globally shared secret cryptographic key to mes-
sage encryption and authentication is implemented. Eight
security suites are deﬁned in the IEEE 802.15.4 standard,
and presented in Table 1. Each suit means a kind of cryp-
tographic algorithm, the mode of block cipher, message
Table 1
IEEE 802.15.4 security suite
Security suite Description
#0 Null No security (default)
#1 AES-CTR Encryption only, CTR mode
#2 AES-CBC-MAC-32 32 bit MAC
#3 AES-CBC-MAC-64 64 bit MAC
#4 AES-CBC-MAC-128 128 bit MAC
#5 AES-CCM-32 Encryption and 32 bit MAC
#6 AES-CCM-64 Encryption and 64 bit MAC
#7 AES-CCM-128 Encryption and 128 bit MAC
authentication code, and the size of message authentica-
tion code. We can classify these suits based on provided
properties, i.e., no security, encryption only (AES-CTR),
authentication only (AES-CBC-MAC), and both encryp-
tion and authentication (AES-CCM). Thus, conﬁdentiality
is achieved through Advanced Encryption Algorithm (AES)
in Counter mode (CTR), integrity through AES in Cipher
Block Chaining Message Authentication Code (CBC-MAC)
mode. The combination is oﬀered with AES in the CTR
with CBC-MAC mode (CCM).
4.2. SPINS: Security Protocol for Sensor Network
The SPINS protocol developed by A. Perrig et al., is de-
scribed in [17]. It consists of two secure building blocks,
i.e., Secure Network Encryption Protocol (SNEP) and mi-
cro version of Timed Eﬃcient Stream Loss-tolerant Authen-
tication (µTESLA). SNEP is used to provide conﬁdentiality
using encryption, and authentication, integrity and fresh-
ness of data using Message Authentication Code (MAC). In
this approach all cryptographic primitives are constructed
from a single block cipher for code reuse. Thus, the com-
munication overhead is limited.
µTESLA is used for broadcasted data authentication.
µTESLA requires that the base station and network nodes
are loosely time-synchronized, and each node knows an
upper bound on the maximum synchronization error. It
generates authenticated broadcast message using symmetric
key, and introduces asymmetric cryptography by delaying
the disclosure of the symmetric keys. Therefore, µTESLA
provides stronger security for networks with constrained
resources. The implementation of SPINS requires about
220 bytes of RAM and 1580 to 2674 bytes of program
space. An increase of energy consumption for security is
about 20%.
4.3. TinySec: Link Layer Security Architecture for
Wireless Sensor Networks
The problem with SPINS is that it has not been yet fully
speciﬁed and implemented. TinySec is a link layer security
architecture designed by Ch. Karlof et al., and presented
in [18]. Similarly to the SNEP protocol, it provides au-
thentication, message integrity and conﬁdentiality services.
Replay protection has been intentionally omitted – the au-
thors argued that this service belongs to the higher layers of
the OSI model. The message authentication and integrity
is provided using MAC, message conﬁdentiality using en-
cryption. Two security modes are possible – authentica-
tion only and authenticated encryption. In case of the ﬁrst
mode, the entire packet is authenticated using MAC, but
the payload data is not encrypted. In case of the second
mode, the payload data is encrypted and then authenticated
with a MAC. Any keying mechanisms can be employed
(single network-wide keys, per-link keys, group keys, etc.).
TinySec is designed as a lightweight, energy eﬃcient se-
curity package. It can be easily integrated into any WSN
application. The implementation of TinySec requires about
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728 bytes of RAM and 7146 bytes of program space. An
increase of energy consumption depends on the mode and
network technology, and is about 3% to 9,1% higher in
compare to a normal TinyOS packet transmission.
4.4. LLSP: The Link-Layer Protocol
A Link-Layer Protocol (LLSP) was designed by L. E. Ligh-
foot et. al., and is described in [19]. The aim was to de-
velop a protocol with less energy requirements than Tiny-
Sec. LLSP guarantees various security requirements but
focuses on three security services: message authentication,
message conﬁdentiality, and replay protection. AES-CBC
mode of operation as the data encryption scheme is im-
plemented in LLSP. The unique design of AES-CBC pro-
vides semantic security, i.e., encrypting the same plaintext
twice will produce two diﬀerent ciphertexts. A synchronous
4-byte counter between the sender and receiver pair is pro-
posed to replay protection. Feedback Shift Register (FSR)
is used to update this counter. The LLSP packet format is
based on the TinySEC one (see Fig. 1). The diﬀerence is
in a size – two byte counter values (Ctr) are removed from
the security overhead in LLSP. As it was mentioned above
both sender and receiver maintain a synchronous counter.
Hence, the counter value has not to be transmitted, so the
counter bytes are eliminated from each message packet.
Thus, the LLSP security protocol reduces the energy usage
without decreasing the security level.
Fig. 1. Packet format in TinySec (a) and in LLSP (b).
The LLSP secure protocol was evaluated via simula-
tion and compared with the TinySec protocol. Both
applications were executed in the TOSSIM simulator
(docs.tinyos.net/index.php/TOSSIM). The results are pre-
sented in [19]. From these results we can see that similar to
most security protocols, the computational and energy costs
increase for each packet transmission. It is concerned with
extra computations and the larger packet size due to the se-
curity overhead. However, the authors of the LLSP protocol
claim that using their solution the energy consumption is
about 15% smaller than for TinySec, and latency reduction
is about 3%.
4.5. LEAP/LEAP+: Localized Encryption and
Authentication Protocol
LEAP [20] and LEAP+ [21] are lightweight, energy ef-
ﬁcient security protocols for large scale sensor networks.
They provide conﬁdentiality and authentication services.
LEAP was designed as a key management protocol to pro-
vide secure communication in WSNs. Due to various secu-
rity requirements for diﬀerent types of messages four types
of keys for each network node are established: an individ-
ual key shared with a base station, a pairwise key shared
with another node, a cluster key shared with a group of
neighboring nodes, and a group key globally shared with
all nodes in a network. The implementation of LEAP re-
quires about 17.8 KB of program space. The RAM usage
and energy costs depend on the number of nodes in a net-
work.
4.6. Security Protocol Based on NOVSF
The cluster-based security protocol proposed in [22] uses
a symmetric cryptography algorithm to guarantee security.
To reduce the drawbacks of a symmetric cryptography and
provide complete security, it employs the code-hopping
technique using the Non-Orthogonal Variable Spreading
Factor (NOVSF) codes. The NOVSF is an implementation
of the non-blocking transmission of CDMA. In NOVSF
codes, each OVSF code has 64 time slots, and any number
of these time slots can be assigned to a channel. In NOVSF,
the data blocks are assigned to time slots using diﬀerent
permutations in every session, Fig. 2. Hence, the blocks
Fig. 2. Code-hopping technique.
of data are ﬁnally mixed, and such reordering method
supports security. The algorithm operates as follows. First,
it is assumed that all network nodes are grouped into
disjoint and mostly non-overlapping clusters. As a result,
a hierarchical communication structure consisting of
a base station, cluster heads and the lowest level formed by
members of clusters is obtained. Secondly, the following
steps of the algorithm are performed:
Step 1: A base station periodically broadcasts the session
key.
Step 2: Sensor nodes generate their cryptographic keys.
Step 3: The encrypted data are transmitted from sen-
sor nodes to cluster heads using NOVSF code-
hopping technique.
Step 4: Each cluster head appends its identiﬁer number
(ID) to this data and then forwards such data to
the higher level cluster heads.
Step 5: The message is decrypted and authenticated by
the base station.
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To sum up, the transmission between nodes and cluster
heads is encrypted. Based on periodically changed user
speciﬁc session keys and NOVSF codes assigned to each
node the authentication of messages is performed. More-
over, changing encryption keys from time to time guaran-
tees data freshness in a network. The CBC-MAC protocol
is used to provide data integrity. The total memory space
for applied cryptographic primitives are about 2 KB. Hence,
applying the NOVSF code-hopping technique increases se-
curity capabilities without requiring additional energy.
4.7. LSec: Lightweight Security Protocol
The Lightweight Security Protocol for distributed wireless
sensor network (LSec) is described in [23]. It is the energy
and memory eﬃcient technique that assumes grouping net-
work nodes into clusters. LSec provides following security
capabilities: authentication, authorization, conﬁdentiality
of data, and protection against intrusions and anomalies.
Both symmetric and asymmetric security schemes are used.
Fig. 3. LSec system architecture.
The LSec architecture consists of the following modules
(see Fig. 3):
• KMM key management module: stores public and
shared secret key of each node with a base station
(BS) to the database (KM),
• TGM token generator module: generates the tokens
for the requesters,
• AzM authorization module: checks whether a partic-
ular node is allowed to communicate with other node
or a group of nodes,
• IDS intrusion detection; cluster heads send alert mes-
sages to IDS (lightweight mobile agents are installed
in cluster heads).
LSec combines the features of trusted server scheme and
self enforcing security scheme described in Section 3. It is
assumed that the base station is the trusted party that never
is compromised. Only the base station has an access to the
public keys of all nodes in the network, and communicat-
ing nodes know each other’s public keys only during the
time of connection establishment. For every session, new
random secret key is used. Each node has to store six keys
(public key of node, private key of node, public key of BS,
group key, public key of other node, session key). 72 bytes
of memory are needed to store these keys. An asymmetric
scheme is used for sharing ephemeral secret key between
communicating nodes. Data is encrypted by using sym-
metric schemes. LSec is employed in the middleware layer
of the communication model. It is scalable and memory
eﬃcient solution.
Authors claim that LSec is highly scalable and memory ef-
ﬁcient – it introduces only 74.125 bytes of transmission and
reception cost per connection. It provides stronger security
and has the advantage of simple secure defense mechanism
against compromised nodes.
4.8. HASF: The Hybrid Adaptive Security Framework
Hybrid Adaptive Security Framework (HASF) is a secu-
rity architecture developed by T. Shon et al., and described
in [24]. This framework provides security capabilities with
less extra energy usage than TinySec. In HASF, security
functions are embedded to the network layer and the link
layer (MAC) of the OSI model separately. The main idea
is to provide hybrid adaptive security suite to each packet
transmitted in a given WSN. The Hybrid Adaptive Security
Suite (HASS) proposed in HASF is almost the same as the
security suite proposed for IEEE 802.15.4, and presented
in Table 1. The diﬀerence to commonly used architectures
in HASS are as follows:
– null security is not provided,
– security suite is dynamically applied to MAC frame
due to a type of a given WSN.
Three network characteristics are distinguished: public,
commercial, private. Various security capabilities are pro-
vided to these groups of network. None conﬁdentiality is
guaranteed for public networks, more security capabilities
are provided in commercial networks, and the strongest se-
curity is provided in private networks. All data are divided
into control and application. Control data means a message
or signal to manage the network operation. Application
data means a kind of data concerned with WSN services.
The attributes of these data are: periodic, urgent-periodic,
on-demand, event-driven. The decisions on security levels
in case of diﬀerent network characteristics are presented in
Table 2. In [24] authors discuss the results of application
of their framework to a testbed network formed by the de-
vices using HASS approach. They compared three kinds
of nodes: IEEE 802.15.4 based system with no security,
HASS based system with the AES encryption algorithm,
Table 2
Hybrid Adaptive Security Suite decision table
Feature #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7
Public (32)
App + +
Ctrl + +
Commercial (64)
App + +
Ctrl + +
Private (128)
App + +
Ctrl + + +
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Table 3
Summary of selected security architectures for WSN
Architecture Security services Properties
SPINS Authentication, Consists of SNEP and µTesla (secure building blocks).
authenticated broadcast, Symmetric cryptography support. Encryption (CTR mode), Block Cipher (RC5).
conﬁdentiality, Not fully implemented and speciﬁed.
integrity, freshness. Requires 2674 bytes of program space (max).
Transmission overhead to 20%.
TinySec Authentication, Link layer architecture easily integrated into WSN.
conﬁdentiality, Symmetric cryptography support. Encryption (CBC mode), Block Cipher (Skipjack).
integrity, Requires 728 bytes of RAM, 7146 bytes of program space (max).
replay protection. Transmission overhead to 9.1%.
LLSP Authentication, Link layer architecture. Symmetric cryptography support. Semantic security.
conﬁdentiality, 2 bytes less packet format (energy cost reduction without security decreasing).
replay protection. Transmission overhead to 7.7%.
LEAP/LEAP+ Authentication, Symmetric cryptography support. Encryption (RC5), Block Cipher (RC5).
conﬁdentiality, Four types of keys available for each sensor node:
intrusions protection, individual, pairwise, cluster, group.
anomalies protection. Defence against: HELLO Flood, Sybil, Wormhole attacks.
Requires about 17.8 KB of program space.
RAM usage and transmission overhead depend on the number of nodes.
NOVSF-based Authentication, Works partially in the physical layer.
conﬁdentiality. Symmetric cryptography support. The security increased via code-hoping technique
integrity, freshness. using NOVSF data blocks (assigned to time slots using permutations
in every session). User speciﬁc session keys (periodically changed).
Clustering-based algorithm.
Requires about 2 KB of memory space.
LSec Authentication, Both symmetric and asymmetric cryptography support.
authorization, Public Key cryptography support.
conﬁdentiality, Base station – the trusted party – a single point of failure.
replay protection, Implemented in the middleware. Clustering-based algorithm.
intrusions protection, Simple Secure key exchange scheme: 6 keys that takes only 72 bytes of memory.
anomalies protection. Transmission overhead to 8.33%.
HASF Authentication, Provides Hybrid Adaptive Security Suite.
conﬁdentiality, Security functions embedded to network and link layer separately.
integrity. Security mechanism dynamically applied to MAC frame.
Three network types with diﬀerent security (public, commercial, private).
Transmission overhead to 4.8%.
and the Crossbow device based on TinySec architecture and
the RC5 encryption algorithm. In the case of described ex-
periments, the extra energy usage due to providing security
functionalities was about 4.8% in case of HASS based sys-
tem and 5.2% in case of TinySec based Crossbow system.
The results conﬁrmed that HASF outperforms the other
common security techniques.
4.9. Summary of Security Architectures
The Table 3 presents the summary of our survey – security
architectures, provided services and their main properties.
5. Secure Energy Eﬃcient Routing
Protocols
Security architectures using a globally shared key are in-
eﬀective in presence of insider attacks or compromised
nodes. Therefore, more sophisticated defense mechanisms
are necessary to provide reasonable protection against
wormholes and insider attacks, and detect malicious nodes.
Secure routing protocols can be used to improve WSN se-
curity. In this section, selected routing protocols for se-
cure networks are presented. Similarly to the solutions de-
scribed in previous sections we focus on energy aware so-
lutions.
5.1. SERP: Secure Energy Efficient Routing Protocol
The secure energy eﬃcient routing protocol for wireless
sensor networks (SERP) is described in [25]. The main
idea of this protocol is to provide a robust transmission
of authenticated and conﬁdential data from the source sen-
sor with limited energy budget to the base station. It is
dedicated to WSNs with densely deployed relatively static
sensor devices.
69
Krzysztof Daniluk and Ewa Niewiadomska-Szynkiewicz
Three main objectives were considered during design of
SERP:
– energy aware organization of the network to ensure
energy eﬃcient transmission, and ﬁnally maximum
lifetime of the network,
– secure transmission; nodes should have the capability
to detect falsely injected reports,
– robust and resilient transmission; any node failure
would not greatly hamper the performance of a net-
work.
The protocol operates in two main phases: creating a back-
bone network and secure data transmission. A sink rooted
tree structure is created as the backbone of the network tak-
ing into consideration balanced energy consumption. Next,
a minimum number of forwarding nodes in the network
is selected. The backbone network is restructured peri-
odically. It is used for authenticated and encrypted data
delivery from the source sensors to the base station. A one
way hash chain and pre-stored shared secret keys are used
for ensuring secure data transmission. An optional key re-
freshment mechanism that could be applied depending on
the application is introduced for data freshness.
The energy saving mechanism is based on disable the ra-
dio transceivers of selected nodes. The nodes in a net-
work can operate in two main states: non-forwarding – the
transceiver is switched oﬀ, forwarding – both transceiver
and sensing devices are switched on. It is assumed that
after the backbone structure is constructed, all nodes are ei-
ther in forwarding or non-forwarding states. Nodes with the
non-forwarding state turn oﬀ their radio transceivers while
keeping the sensing device active. On the other hand, for-
warding nodes keep both radio and sensing device active.
All nodes sense the environment, and after detecting any
event the non-forwarding nodes turn on their radios and
transmit data towards the base station via nodes in a se-
lected path.
The SERP protocol was evaluated via simulation. Ns-2
simulator (www.isi.edu/nsnam/ns/) was used for perfor-
mance analysis. SERP was compared with two popular en-
ergy aware routing protocols – LEACH [26] and EAD [27].
The simulation results are presented and discussed in [25].
The authors claim that SERP is a very competitive solution
compared to the LEACH and EAD protocols w.r.t. energy
requirements. Moreover, SERP provides security function-
alities.
5.2. EENC: Energy Efficiency Routing with Node
Compromised Resistance
A novel energy eﬃciency routing protocol with node com-
promised resistance (EENC) was developed by K. Lin et
al., and described in [28]. EENC bypasses the compro-
mised nodes and improves the accuracy of packets under
the condition of balancing the energy consumption. The
reinforcement learning based on the ant colony optimiza-
tion is used to complete routing tables. The trust values
are assigned to all nodes of a network. The trust value
is computed and based on the multiple behavior attributes
such as: packet drop rate, forwarding delay rate, etc. These
values are used to detect the malicious nodes. Each node in
a WSN computes the trust values of its one hop neighbors.
The idea of EENC was to provide security with minimal
energy consumption. To achieve this, each node storages
trust values of all its neighbors and manages its energy
resources.
The EENC protocol operates as follows. To transmit data
the secure and energy eﬃcient route is computed. The
calculation process consists of many rounds, each divided
into three phases.
• Routing detecting phase. A certain number of for-
ward ants are generated to search for route leading
to the sink. Each ant records the information about
the minimum amount of energy and minimum trust
value for nodes along the path, and the hop number
for each node.
• Pheromone updating phase. The sink node generates
a backward ant, which carries all data collected by
the forward ant. These data are used to update the
pheromone value concerned with each node in a path.
• Routing maintaining phase. The route for a given
source and sink nodes is established based on trust
values and updated pheromone values of the nodes
carried during the pheromone updating phase.
The EENC protocol was evaluated via simulation. The con-
sidered performance metric included lifetime of a network
and a packet correctly received ratio. The EENC perfor-
mance was compared with two other routing algorithms,
i.e., DRP and MTRP described in [29]. Simulation results
presented in [28] conﬁrm that the routing established via
EENC can bypass most compromised nodes in the trans-
mission path and EENC has high performance in energy
eﬃciency. It was observed in the experiments that the cal-
culated lifetime and the successful packet delivery ratio
were much higher for EENC than those obtained for DRP
and MTRP.
5.3. REWARD Routing Protocol
The REceive WAtch ReDirect (REWARD) routing proto-
col for WSNs is described in [30]. This algorithm can
be used to detect black hole attacks [4]. In such attacks,
a malicious node acts as a black hole to attract all the traﬃc
in a WSN through a compromised node. A compromised
node is usually placed in the center and looks attractive
to surrounding nodes and collect most traﬃc destined for
a base station.
In REWARD, the distributed database including suspicious
nodes and areas is created. Two types of broadcast mes-
sages, i.e., MISS (Material for Intersection of Suspicious
Sets) and SAMBA (Suspicious Area, Mark a Black-hole
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Attack) are used to organize this database. MISS is used to
detect identiﬁers of malicious nodes, and SAMBA is used
to identify physical locations of suspicious nodes.
The operation of the REWARD protocol is as follows. In
case of demand-driven routing protocols, the query for path
establishing is sent to the destination node. The destination
node sends its location and waits for a packet. The desti-
nation node broadcasts a MISS message if a packet does
not arrive within a speciﬁed period of time. It copies the
list of all the involved nodes from the query to this MISS
message – these nodes are under suspicion. The ratings for
the nodes are introduced, and path metrics are calculated
by averaging the node ratings in the path. The path with the
highest value of a metric is selected – in this way the sus-
picious nodes are avoided. If a node attempts a black hole
attack and drops a package, it is detected by the next node
in the path. After a predeﬁned time period, the node trans-
mits the packet changing the path and broadcasts a SAMBA
message that provides the location of the black-hole
attack.
REWARD is the energy aware protocol and can be ap-
plied to networks formed by devices that can tune their
transmit power. Diﬀerent levels of security with less and
more overhead according to a network capabilities are pro-
vided. The performance of the protocol is discussed in [30].
The authors compared the energy overhead of two variants
of REWARD.
6. Summary and Conclusions
Many challenges arise from application of wireless ad hoc
networking. We focused on one of them that is very im-
portant in wireless sensor networks – secure data protection
and data transmission in WSN with limited resources. The
paper provides a short overview of some representative en-
ergy eﬃcient security techniques. We brieﬂy discussed the
security requirements of WSNs and showed the relation-
ships between techniques for forming secure networks, and
energy aware WSNs. Next, we described and compared
based on literature survey selected energy aware architec-
tures and protocols in WSNs that can be implemented in
the physical, data link, network, and middleware layers of
the OSI model.
In summary, we can say that due to scarce resources, unique
properties of wireless sensor networks, and often hostile
environments it is a challenging task to protect sensitive
information transmitted by nodes forming a WSN. Due
to limited resources of nodes that form WSN many so-
lutions providing strong security are impractical in this
type of network. Therefore, we can ﬁnd many security
considerations that should be investigated in the nearest
future.
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